Texas State Legislature Expressly Intended To Allow Private Antitrust Claims To Be Brought Under PURA

TCE argues that, under Bill 7, the Texas state legislature expressly intended to allow private antitrust claims to be brought under PURA and that the district court’s decision violates “[t]he primary rule in statutory interpretation [))] that a court must give effect to legislative intent.” In re CPDC, Inc., 337 F.3d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 383 (Tex. 2000)). In support, TCE cites to PURA’s savings clause which states that “[n]othing
in this chapter shall be construed to confer immunity from state or federal antitrust laws. This chapter is intended to complement other state and federal antitrust provisions. Therefore, antitrust remedies may also be sought in state or federal court to remedy anticompetitive activities.” TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.158(b). TCE asserts that the application of the filed rate doctrine violates this provision of the statute by conferring immunity on the defendants. In Square D Co., the Supreme Court rejected this positionlaw.” Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 95 F.3d 383, 391 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, the filed rate doctrine applies with equal force to TCE’s state antitrust claims.3 by explicitly stating that the application of the filed rate doctrine “is far different from the creation ofan antitrust immunity.” 476 U.S. at 422; see also Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 22 (“filed rate doctrine does not leave regulated industries immune from suit under the RICO or antitrust statutes.”). Rather, as
the Court noted, defendants who engage in anticompetitive activities based on filed rates are “still subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws by the Government and to possible criminal sanctions or equitable relief.” Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 422.
 

Moreover, contrary to TCE’s assertions, the filed rate doctrine is very much a part of current federal antitrust law. It has been consistently applied as a defense to antitrust actions by various circuits and by the Supreme Court for decades. Id. at 423 (“the Keogh rule has been an established guidepost at the intersection of the antitrust and interstate commerce statutory regimes for 6 ½ decades . . . [and is] an essential element of the settled legal context in which Congress has repeatedly acted in this area”). Thus, we find that applying the filed rate doctrine, along with other common-law defenses that are normally part of the federal antitrust legal landscape, gives effect to the legislature’s intent to have PURA “complement other state and
federal antitrust provisions.” TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.158(b). Similarly, TCE’s state antitrust arguments))that applying the filed rate doctrine would displace provisions set out in the TFEAA, or that the filed rate doctrine as a whole does not apply to the TFEAA))are misplaced. “[C]ourts have uniformly held . . . that the rationales underlying the
filed rate doctrine apply equally strongly to regulation by state agencies.” Wegoland LTD., 27 F.3d at 20; see also H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 1992) (“the filed rate doctrine applies whether the rate in question is approved by a federal or state agency”); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992); Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F.Supp.2d 647 (E.D.Tex. 1999). Moreover, state antitrust claims do not need to be addressed separately because the TFEAA explicitly “mandates that its provisions be interpreted in harmony with federal antitrust.